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This paper reports on a project in organisational history and 
public policy-making, which is being written from the inside.  
The author was appointed as the Principal of the Canberra College 
of Advanced Education in 1987, as Deputy Vice Chancellor of the 
amalgamated and expanded Australian National University in 1988 
and as the inaugural Vice Chancellor of the University of 
Canberra in 1989. 
 
Drawing on an extensive personal archive of official documents, 
newspaper coverage, internal CCAE documents and personal records 
of meetings, the author first sketches the background to the 
binary system which operated until 1987, the changes which 
produced a Unified National System under Minister John Dawkins 
and the special conditions which prevailed in the Australian  
Capital Territory. 
 
He then describes in detail the policy-making process from the 
perspective of one of the actors, drawing mainly from the public 
record.  As Principal, his first move in response to the reform 
agenda promulgated nationally was to seek allies allowing the 
CCAE to survive as an independent unit despite its perceived sub-
optimal size. When a ministerial edict required a merger with the 
ANU against the strongly stated public objections of the ANU, he 
participated in merger negotiations, including a selection 
process through which he was nominated DVC of the ANU.  
 
When the legislation implementing this decision was defeated in 
the national parliament, Minister Dawkins accepted the need to 
engage with the newly-elected government of the Australian 
Capital territory as well as secure the backing of both governing 
bodies of the two tertiary institutions.  He offered powerful 
financial incentives and penalties in order to secure this 
backing.  The Council of the ANU narrowly rejected the merger, 
the Council of the CCAE secured an alternative sponsor from a 
Victorian university and the ANU Act was withdrawn and replaced 
with the University of Canberra Act at the end of 1989.  
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The author describes his contribution to this process and its 
unexpected outcome.   He also reflects upon the rationality of 
the process and the desirability of the outcome from the point of 
view of the University of Canberra, taking account of more recent 
changes in the government's dealings with the tertiary sector. 
 
This case study may have some relevance to the broader questions 
currently engaging policy makers in both Britain and Australia 
about the appropriate conditions under which tertiary education 
institutions are grouped into larger and more homogenous systems. 
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AN INTIMATE AND PARTIAL HISTORY OF THE END OF THE BINARY SYSTEM 
IN THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 
 
or "How great expectations of John Dawkins and the federal 
government were dashed inside his own backyard etc...." 
 
(footnote: . . with apologies to Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) 
although I do not follow them by representing myself as a 
“sympathetic observer who seeks to build morals on a foundation 
of ruined hopes”.) 
 
The reason for writing this study is to set right a public record 
which has been so clouded by obscurity and confidentiality that 
it provide a misleading representation of the causes and effects 
of a particular piece of public policy making in which the author 
played a leading role. 
 
It also sketches the framework for a more substantial exercise in 
measuring the utility of explanations of public policy making in 
the general political science literature against these events.  
This first stage is both intimate and partial but it is intended 
to serve as a building block for a more expanded, more accurate 
and more reliable analysis through a process of triangulation 
with other participants and observers. 
 
Finally, and more tentatively, the study returns after a decade 
to an assessment of whether the "right" decision was taken, as 
viewed from the perspective of the members of the organisation 
which the author led through its emergence as an independent 
university.  
 
This case study may have some relevance to the broader questions 
currently engaging policy makers in both Britain and Australia 
about the appropriate conditions under which tertiary education 
institutions are grouped into homogenous systems and all accorded 
the title of autonomous universities. 
 
 
 
 4 
   
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
Jane Nichols (1995), warned that: 
 
"Nostalgia is a tricky if pleasantly self-indulgent  
 emotion. It should be tempered by rigorous efforts at      
 objectivity and some attempt at self-criticism.   
 
Sometimes those with nostalgia for the old days in  
 universities can exhibit misty-eyed romanticism and  
 longing for an imperfectly remembered past. And those who 
 idealise the past often paint the present in stark,  
 negative terms.... 
 
Academics individually and collectively should grasp the 
 realities of both the past and the present, and show a 
 willingness to work as a part of a wider community for a 
 better educated, fairer and wider future." 
 
I have tried to heed this warning, both in terms of the distant 
past and the more immediate past – the events I focus upon 
occurred between 1987 and 1990, during which time the Canberra 
College of Advanced Education (CCAE) was transformed into the 
University of Canberra. 
 
To understand what sort of peculiar organisation a CAE was 
requires an excursion back into the 1960's, when higher education 
in Australia was in a demonstrably parlous state.  (Footnote – I 
have dealt with the broad sweep of the evolution of higher 
education in Australia over the second half of the twentieth 
century in my contribution to David Teather's volume in the 
Higher Education Policy Series edited by Maurice Kogan.) 
 
 
In the Nichols article quoted above, she commented that 
 
Universities of the past catered for a social elite who had 
privileged access to both financial and cultural capital which 
enable them to qualify to enter higher  education, on the one 
hand, and to support themselves while they were there on the 
other.  Scholarships were handed out on the basis of 'academic 
merit’, which apparently was also largely the property of people 
who owned the other kinds of capital.  The few working-class kids 
who made it to, and through, university in the 1950's are 
remembered precisely because they were exceptional (p. 8)  
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The Murray Report of 1957 boosted university funding, not so much 
in response to problems of social inequity as much as a perceived 
need by the Menzies Liberal Government to increase a local supply 
of skilled manpower for a booming economy. 
 
The problems of mass demand on existing university institutions 
sowed the seeds for a division of labour, which was intended to 
allow universities to concentrate on their own self-proclaimed 
higher mission.  The chair of the Universities Commission 
produced the 1964 Martin Report, which laid the basis for the 
establishment of Colleges of Advanced Education (CAE), a new 
style of teaching-only institution, cheaper and more subordinate 
to the needs of state employing authorities.  This was to build 
upon existing structures in the technical education area and was 
administered by its own slightly more modest structure, not a 
commission but the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Colleges of 
Advanced Education (CACAE). 
 
In 1968, the CAE sector was effectively extended by including 
provision for commonwealth funding to teacher training colleges, 
which had previously been the absolute preserve of state 
governments, usually Education Departments.  These colleges were 
now expected to develop into multi-purpose institutions and often 
incorporated teacher education, business studies and engineering 
courses at sub-degree level.  The original cadre of staff were 
frequently qualified only to the level required of trainers 
rather than holding higher academic qualifications; their 
strength often lay in their wealth of "industry" experience. 
 
In the process of becoming more diversified and with the 
recruitment of new staff, the new institutions inevitably perhaps 
looked to recruit from universities.   This strengthened when the 
CAE's brought their salary levels into line with those paid at 
universities, at least with respect to the lower grades. 
 
Where there were brand-new institutions created rather than 
grafted onto existing technical and teacher training bodies, 
there no "burden" of staff to be inherited. Often the new senior 
staff coming from universities had less current interest in 
research and more commitment to teaching at the undergraduate 
level; for others, it was the first step on the ladder in a more 
conventional tertiary career.  One such institution was the 
Canberra College of Advanced Education (CCAE), founded in 1969, 
which I joined in 1972 as foundation head of the discipline of 
Politics.  
 
 The Whitlam administration, which came to power in the same 
year, provided a dramatic fillip to participation in higher 
education through the abolition of student fees. The main 
beneficiaries were mature age students, especially women, who 
could study locally at no cost beyond their time and foregone 
income.  The CAE sector also brought access to degree study to 
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many in lower socio-economic groups who had never regarded 
orthodox universities as appropriate to their needs.  The strong 
vocational focus of CAE courses, derived in part from a technical 
heritage, changed the perception of what constituted a legitimate 
range of activities for tertiary study. 
 
Many of the staff of these new institutions moved across from 
training colleges with a strong focus on pedagogy. Even staff 
recruited (as I was) from universities with a strong research 
tradition tended to focus on the content and methodology of 
teaching. Efforts were made to incorporate a strongly practical 
and applied component into the curriculum and CAE's offered a 
wide range of courses not conventionally offered in universities. 
Many practices now commonplace in all universities represented 
major innovations first developed in the CAE sector as part of 
its defining characteristic.  
 
 These organisations grew in confidence and flourished with the 
increase of resources which followed their success in recruiting 
students.  As a result, their staff felt able to identify with 
other members of the academic community in the university sector 
and to compete for funding and recognition of the applied 
research appropriate to their own institutions. 
 
1977 was another milestone of change.   The technical and further 
education sector started its upward spiral as a result of 
increased federal funding for what were exclusively state 
institutions.   At the national policy-making level, a series of 
reports on the future of this sector led to the decision to 
integrate three previously separate administrative bodies with 
responsibility for universities, CAEs and TAFE colleges into a 
single Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (CTEC). This 
body still had a statutory distance from ministerial direction 
and there were powerful independent councils for each of the 
components.  The decision signalled the presence of a new 
competitor for the federal dollars available to support tertiary 
students and a desire for a more integrated approach. 
 
1981 became a small signpost to the future, when the federal 
Liberal/National government, lead by Malcolm Fraser started to 
examine the rationality of supporting separate small institutions 
in close proximity to each other with broadly similar functions. 
Phillip Lynch as Treasurer headed a ‘razor gang’, which conducted 
the first skirmishes, aimed at amalgamation through combination 
of universities and CAEs.  In Queensland this meant the take-over 
by James Cook University of its immediately adjacent neighbour, 
the Townsville College of Advanced Education and the combination 
of all the Brisbane CAEs into a single institution, Brisbane 
College of Advanced Education (BCAE). I have written elsewhere of 
the amalgamation of James Cook University with the Townsville CAE 
(Scott, 1988).  Similar moves occurred in other states, creating 
bodies sometimes referred to, pejoratively, as "uni-colls". 
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Generally the pattern was similar - either a university devouring 
its smaller teacher-training neighbour or several CAEs being 
banded together like pioneer caravans facing the rigours of the 
wild west.  In retrospect, this was a mere pipe-opener, a straw 
in the wind indicative of bureaucratic aspirations, which were 
modified in 1981 by local political resistance. The main event 
was delayed until 1987, with Minister John Dawkins as ringmaster. 
 
 8 
 II.  1987: THE DAWKINS ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 
 
Several more milestones were reached in 1987, almost all of them 
connected directly or indirectly with John Dawkins.  The first of 
these was the creation of the mega-department of Education, 
Employment and Training, with Dawkins as its first minister.  
This elevated the significance of education, which had grown from 
a mere office only a generation previously. 
 
The second change was the introduction of direct charges to 
university students in the form of the Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme. A recent study by one of the senior 
bureaucrats within this new department makes it clear that HECS 
was the highest priority because it was the only sound financial 
basis on which the system could be rapidly expanded. (footnote 
Meredith Edwards). 
 
The third change and the one under close analysis here was the 
thrust towards amalgamation to create larger and more cost-
efficient organisations in a single Unified National System to 
replace the binary division between universities and CAE’s. 
 
McCollow and Knight (1993) suggest that these changes signalled 
that the Hawke Government intended to treat education as a direct 
instrument of economic policy. This involved not only the 
directing of its efforts towards the provision of the needed 
‘human capital' but its subjection to further efficiency measures 
and its pursuit of educational marketing opportunities 
 
The issuing of epoch-making Green and White Papers followed 
closely on Dawkins' appointment.  These were not the outcome of 
deliberations by an independent expert committee like the major 
policy documents which preceded them but the outpourings from 
within the new department and from the minister's own staff - and 
directly attributable to the individual preferences of the new 
minister.   
 
In summary, the Green Paper indicated that a Unified National 
System was to be established with a set of new ground rules 
linking size of individual institutions to differential access to 
public funding.  This was accomplished by creating an arbitrary 
minimum size below which existing institutions would not be able 
to survive as independent entities funded at the maximum rate.  
This resulted in pressure on many CAEs (including CCAE) and a few 
smaller universities (including the ANU) to become part of a 
larger organisation.  
 
In addition, funding formulae and public rhetoric encouraged 
existing relatively large universities to become even larger.  
There were already several CAE’s at the appropriate size level – 
mainly the state capital cities' eponymous Institutes of 
Technology. These bodies had formed themselves into a pressure 
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group to differentiate themselves from the smaller and dispersed 
organisations operating from a base of teacher training 
activities or on regional sites.  The chief executives had formed 
themselves into a body called DOCIT – Directors of Central 
Institutes of Technology.  Canberra's Principal was a prime mover 
in the foundation of this body. 
 
The DOCIT institutions apart from the special case of Canberra 
moved rapidly to claim university status as soon as it became 
available. For constitutional reasons, states have the final say 
in the actual mechanisms for approval of these bodies becoming 
universities. The state governments set up processes of 
accreditation based on generous definitions of comparable 
academic merit.  
 
In some jurisdictions, where smaller CAE's clearly could not meet 
this test, a system of sponsorship provided for a period of 
tutelage by an established university, so that places like the 
Northern Territory acquired a tiny university with support from 
Queensland University.  Monash expanded its activity by 
sponsorship of former CAE's in both suburban and regional 
Victoria, the University of New South Wales also took on the 
sponsorship of a new institution called Charles Sturt University 
linking widely separated campuses in Wagga, Bathurst and later 
Albury (but not Wodonga, just over the Murray, which stayed 
Victorian).  
 
Profiles of the range of academic offerings and the quantum of 
enrolments for each institution were then subjected to a much 
more stringent set of conditions, to be negotiated with a joint 
planning committee representing the interests of states as well 
as the Commonwealth.  There was also increasing specification of 
the internal management arrangements of universities, which were 
examined during site visits to discuss profiles. 
 
In particular, greater emphasis was placed upon universities 
becoming increasingly self-reliant in terms of additional funding 
earned by consultancies and the charging of fees for a range of 
postgraduate awards.  There was also heavy pressure to engage in 
recruiting overseas students.  
 
The unification of the UNS was accomplished by central control.  
CTEC – the former statutory body advising the national government 
- was presumed to be dominated by the self-interest of 
universities, whose spokespeople had dominated the policy debate 
about the future of the sector.  It was replaced by a National 
Board for Employment, Education and training (NBEET). This body 
was more directly accountable to the minister and in turn 
controlled a series of subordinate councils, including one more 
directly related to the employment components of the new 
department.  In addition, membership of all these boards and 
councils was extended to provide for a wider range of interests, 
 
 10 
especially those of employers and trade unions. 
 
None of these changes were welcomed anywhere in the academic 
community.  Students resented the imposition of fees, which had 
been abolished a generation earlier.  There was concern about the 
emphasis on commercialisation associated with the recruitment of 
overseas students in dramatically increased numbers.  University 
staff and alumni were alarmed about the threat they perceived to 
academic standards posed by the broadening of the definition of 
university status and by the intrusion into institutional 
autonomy in terms of changes to governing bodies and more 
direction of their activities through the prescriptive planning 
process. 
 
Right across Australia, amalgamation proposals were greeted with 
hostility from many universities, although most finally tolerated 
an outcome which seemed to guarantee them a stronger basis for 
funding in the future.  A few remained unreconciled to the end, 
especially where fragile universities were suspicious of 
associations with CAE's once considered beneath their dignity.  
The root cause of the problem was the incompatibility between the 
academic cultures and aspirations of the two types of 
institutions;  Canberra provided a graphic illustration.   
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III.  1987-1989: The Birth Pangs of the University of Canberra 
 
 
Canberra was a special case for Minister Dawkins, since the major 
university (the ANU) had operated since its inception under the 
benevolent control of the federal government, with education 
initially an office with the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet.  Over time, the Office broadened into a department which 
went beyond the previous confines of collecting statistics, 
administering an international scholarship plans and providing 
special purpose funding to schools.  When the CCAE was created in 
1968, it was seen as being designed to meet the parochial needs 
of the inhabitants of the capital's territory, and was under the 
direction of a more mundane Department of Territories. 
 
As Minister for Education, Dawkins made it clear that he intended 
to exploit the direct control the Commonwealth could exercise 
over both institutions in its own territory.  The future 
arrangement for the ANU and the CCAE was a test-case, one which 
needed to be made to work in order to demonstrate the feasibility 
of his general model of institutional consolidation. (This is a 
point well made in Bruce Juddery's 1989 article, "An Unfruitful 
Marriage of Fish and Fowl", which also fills in the earlier 
history of the ANU's persistent hostility towards change). 
 
As Aitkin (1999) has also pointed out, the ANU itself was a 
binary institution, an uneasy amalgam of research schools at the 
historic core and a later accretion of an undergraduate “school 
of general studies” which had started life as a separate college 
of Melbourne University; each half had a different set of 
interests in the outcome of any reform of the existing 
structures. This latter school offered nation-wide scholarships 
to boost the quality and size of its entrants but was essentially 
providing university opportunities for the local population.  Its 
reluctance to diversify into newer areas of study, specifically 
teacher education, ultimately created the market opportunity for 
the CCAE - an earlier Vice-Chancellor had been humiliated when he 
had supported the introduction of teacher training, a move which 
provoked a vigorous debate which he ultimately lost. (Juddery op 
cit) 
 
As newly-appointed Principal of the Canberra CAE, my first task 
in late 1987 was to assist in the preparation of the College's 
response to the Green Paper and then defend that response once 
the White Paper had been issued in the following year as a 
statement of government policy. 
 
This was seen by all concerned to require developing strategies 
for expanding enrolments to meet the growth targets required to 
meet the minimum size requirement for entry to the Unified 
National System. Given the planning constraints on numbers within 
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existing institutions, this seemed only possible by some form of 
affiliation with other institutions. 
 
It seemed clear at the outset that the ANU had no interest 
whatever in being part of those plans.  The only exception they 
were prepared to make was to form a close relationship with the 
Schools of Art and Music, then of TAFE status but located 
adjacent to the ANU campus.  These two bodies had recently been 
grouped in response to earlier amalgamation pressures to form the 
Canberra Institute of the Arts (CITA).  The leader of this new 
institution was Professor Peter Karmel, a former Vice-Chancellor 
of the ANU and former Chair of CTEC. Art and Music were perceived 
as more appropriate for "real" universities than the more 
vocational offerings which typified CAE’s, like education, 
engineering, nursing, management and journalism. 
 
There were plenty of other players in the cast.  In addition to 
the ANU and CCAE, there was the Australian Defence Forces Academy 
(ADFA), which was a college of the University of New South Wales, 
a small Catholic CAE which ultimately became a campus of the 
Australian Catholic University network operating across eastern 
Australia, and a small protestant theological institution which 
eventually linked with Charles Sturt University, the product of a 
consolidation of former CAEs across the border in NSW. 
 
Initially the College’s main hope was to seek to increase its 
numbers by embracing the much larger student numbers on offer in 
the Technical and Further Education sector.  There several 
separate institutions had been grouped at an earlier stage into 
the Canberra Institute of TAFE.  There were precedents in other 
states, notably in the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, 
for TAFE and CAE activities to co-exist.  CCAE also sought to 
continue to align itself with the DOCIT group – it had earlier 
flirted with the idea of changing its name to the Canberra 
Institute of Technology but was rebuffed internally by the non-
technologists who constituted the majority of the staff. 
 
So the first independence strategy was to propose a University of 
Technology, the title increasingly being adopted by several of 
the much larger DOCIT members in their own push for university 
status.  I sat on a committee of accreditation (along with Don 
Aitkin, then head of the Australian Research Council) which 
translated Brisbane’s QIT into QUT.  For the CCAE to travel this 
route, it needed to meet the Dawkins enrolment minima by the 
inclusion of CITAFE.  Precedents existed for this sort of 
arithmetic in Melbourne, but it turned out not to be a foregone 
conclusion that the TAFE leadership would accept this route to 
quasi-university status.  
 
The head of CITAFE decided that TAFE interests could not be 
safeguarded in that arrangement and ultimately went his own way, 
ironically claiming the title of Institute of Technology as his 
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own, which he had opposed for the CCAE as an appointed member of 
the CCAE Council.  Nevertheless, until that all played out later 
on, the proposal for a University of Technology enjoyed wide 
local support in the ACT community and among its aspiring 
political leaders.  Staff inside CCAE were ambivalent about the 
technology tag, as they had been about the earlier proposal, but 
supportive of the idea of moving to separate university status on 
whatever ground-rules were being set by the system.   
 
One of the major supporters of the University of Technology was 
the ACT territorial administration within the federal Department 
of Territories.  This goup was somewhat preoccupied with its 
planning for the establishment of an independent political entity 
analogous to statehood.  As part of my general strategy of 
community engagement, I participated vigorously in the 
administrative co-ordination committee linking the CEO’s of all 
the major administrative groupings – TAFE, education, water and 
power, transport etc. – under the chairmanship of Bill Harris, 
the chief bureaucrat specifically responsible to the Minister for 
Territories for the ACT section of his portfolio.  [Both Harris 
and the head of the ACT TAFE system served on the CCAE Council, 
as did representatives of the ANU, making it difficult to keep 
anything potentially in conflict with their interests 
confidential while keeping the governing body fully informed.] 
  
 
The preparation of documents advocating the University of 
Technology option were produced for Council, the ACT 
Administrative Co-ordination Committee and ultimately as a 
Ministerial Submission to the Minister of Territories.  This 
proceeded through the early part of 1988 with the full support of 
the ANU – their only interest was remaining separate and, if 
necessary, embracing the Institute of the Arts to top up their 
student numbers. 
 
  
All of this groundwork came to nothing when Minister Dawkins 
peremptorily announced in July 1988 that, despite stated 
preferences of all concerned, only one university would exist in 
Canberra under the new Unified National System. He set up a small 
committee to accomplish that objective.  He also created a 
national task force to report on progress towards amalgamations 
across the country, with satisfcatory progress made a 
prerequisite for full funding support.  
 
The implementation committee was chaired by Hugh Hudson, who had 
both been involved with CTEC and as a state government politician 
in higher education.  [The other four members were Laurie Nichol, 
Vice Chancellor of the ANU; Peter Karmel, ex ANU VC, ex-chair of 
CTEC and now head of the Institute of the Arts; Keith Lyon, 
Deputy Head of the ACT Administration and myself].  
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It is worth noting the views of Don Aitkin, ex-ANU and at the 
time on the sidelines at the Australian Research Council, 
subsequently my successor as Vice-Chancellor of the University 
of Canberra.  In his view, expressed in the 1999 Teather 
volume cited earlier,  “Such an amalgamation was not an 
inspired piece of public policy, however it may have looked to 
outsiders”.  Aitkin noted that the CCAE staff feared loss of 
identity and that the institution’s emphasis on teaching would 
not survive in the research-dominated culture of ANU; by 
contrast, the ANU perceived that the CCAE was not a real 
university, that its staff were underqualified and the courses 
it offered were inappropriate for a university. (Teacher pp 
51-55) 
 
My own first reaction was that the ANU would fight hard and only 
reluctantly accept a merger in which their interests were 
exclusively served to the detriment of CCAE staff and students.  
Such a merger would only be rendered barely acceptable if it 
meant no significant changes to the way they conducted their 
business.  But even these terms would be unpopular with the bulk 
of staff at the ANU; any concessions to CCAE interests would 
render it anathema.   
 
The reaction of the head of the CCAE Council, a serving federal 
public servant, was to indicate that his direct experience with 
Minister Dawkins suggested that opposition was hopeless and we 
should work hard to secure the best deal available by supporting 
the move.  The founding Principal had remained in touch with 
events and advised me to opt for the strategy of devolution and 
separate development – aim at being left alone on the existing 
CCAE campus and become in effect a separate College of the ANU.  
He anticipated that the ANU would manifest its characteristic 
distaste for involvement in CAE-style activity and thus would 
allow a high level of autonomy in practice. 
 
After consulting my two assistant principals, I decided in effect 
to reject both pieces of advice.  My private view was that no 
deal with the ANU would benefit the CCAE staff as much as 
remaining independent, because the terms of such a deal would be 
varied by the ANU in practice once the new structure was in 
place.  And the best way of remaining fully independent was to 
pursue the option least acceptable to the ANU – a fully 
integrated model which gave me a major role as DVC in the 
undergraduate activities of the ANU as well as the CCAE. If 
Dawkins proved powerful enough to deliver this model as the core 
of the deal, then my second-best outcome still left me better 
placed to act as guarantor at the centre of the new ANU. 
 
I appreciated that, given that the Minister had issued a 
directive, we at the CCAE would be courting disaster in terms of 
punitive resource penalties if the above terms became our public 
position. CCAE as an institution was too young and vulnerable to 
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risk such punishment for resisting amalgamation and it could be 
denied access to the benefits of the title of university if it 
were blamed for the failure.  The ANU by contrast already had an 
established national reputation and was rich enough and 
influential enough to conduct a campaign of opposition. My 
strategy therefore was to take a public position strongly in 
favour of amalgamation, with the proviso that it was fair and 
equitable. 
   
Therefore the thrust of the actions of a small inner group of my 
advisers was directed towards making sure that the cost of the 
merger to the ANU was so high that they either would not pay it 
(our preferred outcome) or – as second best from the CCAE point 
of view – the ANU paid that cost by making genuinely significant 
concession which advanced the interests of the staff and students 
of the CCAE.  
 
This meant that we had to ensure that the detailed terms of the 
merger could not be represented as a simple takeover of the CCAE 
resources by the ANU.  This would clearly be their preferred 
second-best option – an “apartheid” organisational model that 
left the CCAE staff exactly where they were, both physically and 
organisationally, but subordinate to a central control which 
ensured that all decisions favoured ANU interests.  
 
 In these negotiations we expected to receive support from the 
federal and territorial governments and bureaucrats because they 
wanted a “real” amalgamation and not a sham.  By contrast, we did 
not expect to receive much support from the implementation 
committee, loaded as it was with ANU sympathisers.  More 
equitable treatment could be expected in bodies drawn from staff 
in both institutions, particularly in those faculties who were 
keen to develop workable relationships to mutual benefit. 
 
So the negotiations often produced CCAE “bids” which were judged 
to seem unreasonable to the ANU.  We also took independent action 
while still an autonomous body which were designed to offend ANU 
susceptibilities as well as advance CCAE interests. 
 
The major example of the former was an insistence that as 
putative DVC I should have direct line responsibility for all 
undergraduate study on both campuses and not just for CCAE staff 
on its existing campus.  This exemplified our commitment to a 
fully integrated model, which was fiercely resisted by many staff 
at the ANU as well as its leadership.  This meant exterting 
pressures for "rationalisation" where there was duplication of 
course content – in law, accounting, social sciences, science, 
languages, maths etc.  Unified staffing arrangements and common 
access for students became the mantra, soon expanded into common 
access to libraries,research infrastructure and staff workloads. 
 
Examples of independent actions which made clear that CCAE were 
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not doormats was a re-classification of their senior academic 
staff with university-style titles. (see attached press clipping 
on CAE creating professors)  Colleges of Advanced Education had 
been empowered since the 1970's to pay salaries of comparable 
remuneration to university Readers and Professors but were 
expected to use designations emphasising the focus on teaching 
and research – Principal Lecturers and College Fellows. After 
some of the larger CAE’s outside Canberra moved hesitantly to 
adopt Professorial titles, we followed suit and our Principal 
Lecturers and College Fellows were re-christened as Associate 
Professors and Professors.  This was justified by us as 
safeguarding the interests of our own staff, who would otherwise 
be likely to be denied such titles in an amalgamated structure.   
 
The second issue which, almost unbeknown to us, created even more 
of a sense of outrage was the application of the logic of 
institutional nomenclature which was occurring throughout the 
system.  New institutions made up of separate CAE’s were given 
new names to underline that no single institution was dominant – 
thus Charles Sturt University emerged from a collection of 
separate campuses across country NSW and names like Deakin, 
Curtin and Edith Cowan emerged in other states.  We argued, with 
our tongue firmly in our cheek, that the same logic should apply 
in the amalgamated structure in the ACT, which should be 
henceforth the National University of Australia or even named 
after a pre-eminent national politician. This latter idea had 
been floated by the local trade union organisations wanting 
Chifley as the title. It was a pleasant surprise to find a recent 
history of the ANU indicates that this was perceived as a serious 
challenge to the ANU's sense of identity.  
 
As part of the final stages of the implementation process, the 
government agreed that my position should be safeguarded 
legislatively rather than left to the whims of the post-merger 
ANU.  I went through a charade of appointment as DVC, finishing 
second in a field of two for the two top jobs.  The ANU then 
lived up to the College's worst expectations when, prior to the 
amalgamation but after my appointment as DVC-in-waiting, they 
appointed a second DVC who would clearly be seen as the “real” 
second-in-command of the new unified structure. (see attached 
press clipping, Canberra Times, 11 July 1987) 
 
The end of the amalgamation proposal was a two-stage process.  
The first stage was the presentation of legislation to the 
federal parliament in December 1988, based on the outcome of the 
implementation committee and its adjunct bodies, ensuring the 
senior appointments and setting up the terms of future 
management.  A press release from the Minister identified that 
the post of DVC was a temporary one only – the first I had heard 
of this – and that I would have special responsibility for 
implementing the terms of the amalgamation. 
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In the discussions on the legislation, the major opposition group 
– a conservative coalition of Liberal and National Parties – took 
cognisance of the repeated and widespread opposition to the 
amalgamation, including resolutions of the ANU Council, Academic 
Board, staff and student associations and alumni. The status of 
the ANU as a national icon was seen to be at risk, especially if 
it were to be subordinated in any way to the emerging ACT 
territorial government.   Local politicians including those from 
the governing Labor Party as well as the Liberals also came out 
strongly in support of the idea of the ANU remaining unchanged 
(apart from absorbing art and music) and of the CCAE becoming a 
University of Technology. 
 
As is usual with the Australian Senate, the governing party with 
the majority in the lower house faces a potentially hostile 
majority if the opposition coalition is joined by other smaller 
parties represented by virtue of a proportional representation 
franchise.  In this period, the Australian Democrats held the 
balance of power and – as a slightly green and libertarian group 
– would not have been expected to oppose the Dawkins reforms.  
However the spokesman on education, a Queensland Senator I had 
known from my own university days there, was persuaded by 
arguments in favour of community engagement that the soon-to-be -
elected ACT Assembly should be given the opportunity to make its 
views known.  Indeed, amalgamation might become an electoral 
issue if there was significant disagreement between the parties 
on the matter.  The Democrats indicated therefore that they would 
join the opposition coalition and would vote against the 
amalgamation legislation if it was presented before the ACT 
Assembly had had a chance to consider the matter and offer advice 
to the Minister.   
 
Minister Dawkins then indicated that the legislation would be 
withdrawn and presented after the ACT Assembly had commissioned 
and received a report from one of its own select committees 
appointed for the purpose.  All further work on the details of 
the amalgamation was suspended and the ANU went ahead and filled 
its own DVC position, responsible for the affairs of research and 
the Institute of Advanced Studies.  However it was made clear 
that the matter would be reconsidered after the ACT Assembly 
Report and both the ANU VC and I continued to argue strongly in 
favour of the merger because of the potential benefits of 
collaboration and the potential costs if neither institution was 
admitted to the highest-funded segment of the Unified National 
System.  Both of us gave evidence to that effect to the 
committee, which also received strong representations from forces 
opposed to the merger, including student associations from both 
campuses and the staff of the ANU.  There also private 
discussions with committee members and relevant bureaucrats at 
federal and state level. 
 
In the middle of the year, this committee reported in favour of 
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the ANU merging only with CITA and supported the proposal for a 
Canberra University of Technology, separate from the Institute of 
TAFE. It noted that the elements of close co-operation already 
demonstrated could be equally well achieved under a dual rather 
than a single institutional umbrella. 
 
Minister Dawkins remained unpersuaded by these recommendations 
and indicated that future funding allocations would be prejudiced 
by the absence of a merger.  There was a specific carrot on 
offer, the creation of a unified Engineering School for the ACT 
and a large building to be located at the CCAE : to this point, 
the ANU had not been offering an undergraduate engineering 
qualification but now wished to move in this direction. In 
addition, in some faculties on both campuses, the earlier 
discussions had sparked a genuine commitment to the ideas of 
collaboration.   
 
While the CCAE remained committed to a fair and integrated 
amalgamation, the ANU was deeply divided.  Many of those in 
favour generally wanted something unfair and segregated in order 
to identify any likely balance of benefit for the ANU; those 
against were untrusting of the capacity of their own senior 
managers and conducted a campaign of open vilification.   
 
Matters came to a head when Minister Dawkins established a 
timetable for the reintroduction of the legislation to take 
effect by January 1,1990.  The series of ANU Council and Canberra 
CAE Council meetings were scheduled in August and September. I 
sought to have the matter deferred at the CCAE Council meeting in 
August on the grounds of growing uncertainty about the nature of 
the ANU’s commitment.  This was in the light of public statements 
being made by ANU leaders at protest meeting in the privacy of 
the ANU that seemed to indicate a determination to breach the 
spirit of equity and integration.   
 
I was also becoming concerned privately that opinion was swinging 
in favour of the merger at the ANU.  I had started to use an 
office on the ANU campus, mingle with disciplinary colleagues in 
the research schools and undergraduate faculties and at the 
University House social centre as befitting a DVC-elect. I had 
also given a staff seminar to the ANU political scientists which 
gathered a wider audience and received a good hearing from both 
supporters and critics of the amalgamation (reported on in the 
attached CCAE Newsletter.  One of my close friends there reported 
afterwards that it seemed that "my stocks had risen", that 
critics were more reconciled and supporters heartened. 
 
At this point, the merger seemed likely to proceed, especially as 
most CCAE staff members were understandably enthusiastic about 
the prospect of gaining university status at whatever cost.  They 
were concerned only to get the best deal available; the only 
choice available seemed to be the ANU.  I now acted to offer an 
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alternative choice in the weeks before the ANU was scheduled to 
hold its key Council meeting. 
 
At the August meeting of the CCAE Council meeting, I moved to 
avoid taking a firm position on the ANU merger.  Instead I was 
able to report on discussions that I had been conducting for some 
weeks.  I had previously speculated in public about a 
hypothetical future if the merger was rejected by the ANU.  
Throughout August I promoted the option of Monash as a specific 
alternative.  The choice of Monash as an alternative sponsor was 
widely welcomed among the academic community and provided an 
invaluable means of reassuring CCAE staff that they were not in 
any sense at the mercy of the ANU’s prejudices in order to secure 
their future as university staff members.  The CAE Academic Board 
and later open meetings of all staff unanimously endorsed this 
strategy if the ANU declined to support the merger. 
 
Two days before the ANU Council was due to meet in September, 
amid speculation about a nearly-tied vote, I sent a newsletter to 
my own staff assuring them that the merger would only be 
supported if there was reliable commitment by the ANU leadership 
to the spirit of our previous discussions.  Resources at the ANU 
would not be retained exclusively for the ANU, for example, as 
had been indicated in some of the recent public utterances and 
there would be genuine parity of treatment for staff and 
students.  There had been a particularly vitriolic exchange in 
the press between opponents and proponents from within the ANU 
the day before.  (Newsletter attached)  
 
When this newsletter found its way to the media next day and 
circulated widely at the ANU, it was interpreted to mean that I 
had gone cold on the sort of merger which the ANU believed was on 
offer.  This lost me a few friends and supporters at the ANU and, 
not least, Minister Dawkins.   He instructed his most senior 
adviser to tell me that I should publish a clarification that I 
still did favour the merger and that I had been reassured that 
ANU would be compelled to honour the spirit of the agreement.   
This should be published immediately because of the imminence of 
the ANU Council debate.   When I omitted to do so, I was warned 
again that there would never be approval for university status 
for the CCAE while Dawkins was Minister. 
 
The next day, the ANU Senate met and by a very narrow majority 
voted against the merger despite the advocacy of al the senior 
officers of the university.  The following week, the CCAE Council 
met and advised that it did not believe it was feasible to 
proceed with discussions of a merger in the light of the ANU 
decision.  Instead the Monash option would be actively pursued 
and, at a meeting of CCAE staff shortly afterwards, this option 
was unanimously and enthusiastically endorsed.  
 
Minister Dawkins graciously agreed that the Monash option was an 
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acceptable application of the broad parameters of the Unified 
National System.  I suspect I was helped in this by my choice of 
Monash as a sponsor – I had originally contemplated the 
University of New South Wales, given its experience in sponsoring 
nearby CAE’s and its existing relationship with the Defence 
Academy in Canberra.  On the advice of the head of the University 
of Technology Sydney (another ex-CAE successfully turned 
university), which had agreed to be my fallback sponsor, I 
approached Professor Mal Logan.  I had worked on previous 
government committees with Professor Logan and he was famous for 
his general entrepreneurial zeal, his membership of “the purple 
circle” of close advisers to Minister Dawkins and his distaste 
for the ANU. 
 
With a minimum of fuss and just a few bureaucratic flurries, the 
“new ANU” legislation was withdrawn and resubmitted as the 
University of Canberra Act. It became law, on schedule, on 
January 1, 1990.   
 
Epilogue 
 
The public relief and rejoicing were tempered in private by the 
assurances in private and the public commitment of Minister 
Dawkins to re-visiting the question at a later stage, at the end 
of the Monash period of tutelage.  Given the trigger of a 
periodic review of the ANU Research Schools provided for in their 
legislation, during 1991 the idea was revived of separating the 
undergraduate activities of the ANU and merging them alone with 
the new University of Canberra. This was proposed by a committee 
chaired by the new head of CTEC.   
 
Don Aitkin, who had by then left the federal education 
bureaucracy to succeed me as VC at the University of Canberra, 
came out strongly in support. But the idea was never likely to 
take off because of the way it united the ANU in opposition, 
perhaps more strongly than ever before.   
 
In my parting comments on moving to become Director-General of 
the Queensland Department of Education, I affirmed my view that, 
once the Monash connection ended, the new university should 
revert to the relationship it had enjoyed with the ACT while a 
CAE.  When CTEC’s latest proposals failed, pressure emerged again 
for the transfer of the University of Canberra legislation to the 
ACT, now well-established as a living political organism (albeit 
still Lilliputian in scale and the object of widespread derision 
for its sometimes farcically multi-party shenanigans.)  This 
finally occurred in 1997, signalling that the federal government 
had finally given up on its merger aspirations. 
 
Ironically, the bureaucratic committee that launched this third 
attempt at amalgamation was chaired by Professor Ian Chubb, who 
had succeeded Ramsay as head of NBEET. Chubb has recently become 
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Vice Chancellor of the ANU.  
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IV.  RETROSPECTIVE - WAS IT A GOOD POLICY OUTCOME?  
 
 
(a) Winning the Battle 
 
 
Bob Lingard remarked back in 1994, 
  
There have been many achievements of the Unified National 
System of higher education, not the least of which is the 
expanded participation of young Australians and the 
embedding of targeted equity programs across the system. 
However, the mix of regulatory and deregulatory relations 
between the government and the universities has 
precipitated a number of policy dilemmas. (1994) 
  
One of the most poignant relates to the effect of the decision 
in 1989 to create the University of Canberra.  How does the 
decision to create a University of Canberra look in 
retrospect, given that it was such a close-run thing? More 
particularly, did I do the right thing by staff and students 
when I played an active role in encouraging the ANU to resist 
the merger? 
 
 Would I as Principal of the CCAE and holding a letter of 
appointment as Deputy Vice Chancellor of the expanded ANU have 
better served my constituents – staff and the student body - 
if I had chosen to push hard for the merger rather than seek 
to obstruct it? 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that my interventions may have 
been pivotal in shaping the outcome of the final crucial vote 
in the ANU Council. 
 
The following is part of the account in the Canberra Times of 
the debate on September 9 that led to rejection by a vote of 
20-16.   
 
Professor Bryant, the Dean of Science, who spoke strongly for 
the amalgamation...wanted to say that a letter circulated to 
all council members and reported in yesterday’s Canberra Times 
had been “offensive” and “frankly insulting” about the CCAE.  
However, Professor Bryant said that a newsletter from the 
principal of the CCAE was also “offensive” and typified the 
way in which attitudes at the ANU had been manipulated by the 
CCAE in the past year.  He accused Professor Scott of “adroit 
political manoeuvring” to secure the high ground. 
 
The head of the Research School of Social Sciences, Professor 
Paul Bourke, said he found himself in a middle position.  
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Until now, he had supported every move towards amalgamation.  
Now, however, he found himself moving in another direction. 
 
Previously he had voted a marginal “for” on the ground that 
there would be growth of moneys in the system.  His Faculty 
had voted against.  At the board meeting he had said that he 
believed his faculty was wrong.  But now, as a member of 
Council, he could only do that on two conditions:  if the 
signal around the university was unequivocal and if there was 
a clear signal that the CCAE really wanted the merger. 
 
Professor Scott’s letter was a political intervention.  It 
meant that the ANU could struggle to a “yes” vote only to be 
confronted by with the strong view of the College.  Professor 
Scott had stressed the importance of the “fully integrated 
model” for amalgamation.  The ANU had fudged it and fell a 
long way short of Professor Scott’s view.” 
 
Would staff and students have been better off getting their 
degrees inside the ANU, however unfavourable the terms 
currently then on offer?  Gregor Ramsay, then head of CTEC, 
clearly felt that I had misplaced my efforts.  When I moved on 
to be Director-General of Education back in Queensland, he 
wrote a letter of congratulation, which suggested that the 
continued existence of four universities remained an unsolved 
problem and that I had been diverted into spending most of my 
time at CCAE in pursuit of a negative goal.  Others spoke of 
my achievements in more generous terms, notably politicians on 
all sides in their contribution to the debate on the final 
piece of legislation.  
 
The short-term assessment of the media was also favourable, as 
seen in attachment 1 (Verona Burgess article in CT).  This may 
have been related to the fact that the leading columnist on 
the Canberra Times had been outspoken in his personal capacity 
as an alumni-elected member of the ANU Senate.  He used the 
device of resigning to force a by-election to allow an 
identification of the high levels of discontent with the 
merger proposal. 
 
The cartoon that appeared during the height of the debate in 
March captured the values, attitudes and cultures of the two 
institutions.  This gave me a chance to articulate in my 
letter to the Editor, attachment X, my argument for a 
productive amalgamation and to indicate the terms which I 
regarded as representing an equitable outcome (terms which 
presumably reinforced opposition at the ANU based on their 
preference for an inequitable outcome). 
 
It was a striking feature of the contemporary debates that 
there was a continuous appearance of consensus among the CCAE 
staff while there was constant acrimony among the ANU staff.  
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This remained true even though the public position of the CCAE 
leadership underwent several changes – from advocating a 
University of Technology embracing the TAFE sector to 
acceptance of the amalgamation as the best basis available for 
gaining access to university status to propounding the 
alternative of separation under Monash sponsorship.  There 
must have been times when they regarded their leader as akin 
to the Grand Old Duke of York. 
 
As far as I could make out, the academic staff was unanimous 
in its enthusiasm for gaining university status.  Their 
enthusiasm was tempered to varying degrees by their suspicion 
of the motives and attitudes of their opposite numbers at the 
ANU.  Where there was overlap in activities, some staff at 
both institutions moved to maximise benefits from a merger, a 
notable feature in the sciences.  Other staff in both 
institutions took up defensive postures, particularly where 
the quality of the two cohorts of students were differentiated 
by differences in entry scores.  General staff at CCAE were 
mainly concerned about the security of their tenure and the 
level of autonomy, so this group probably privately favoured 
the “apartheid” model which would have created little 
disruption to their current campus and range of 
responsibilities – and the Monash connection which ultimately 
provided this. 
 
Staff representatives on the governing council – who usually 
caucused through the trade union linkages – were able to 
represent this diversity of views without creating an 
impression of public dissent.  Students remained hostile to 
change from the start, even initially being suspicious of 
university status as undermining the practical quality of 
their courses.  They campaigned aggressively and in concert 
with ANU students against the merger and were profusely 
supportive when the Monash option suddenly landed on the 
table.  Their hostility served the purposes of the CCAE 
management in strengthening their bargaining position and this 
support was informally co-ordinated with the CCAE leadership 
in relation to “in-house” material rapidly reaching the press. 
 
This coherence was a product in part of the newness of the 
institution and the patterns of open communication built up by 
the first Principal when the College was founded.  Council 
meetings rarely became acrimonious, not least because of the 
presence of representatives of outside competing interests. 
Only occasionally did the mass media detect differences of 
opinion where merger enthusiasts seemed out of line with the 
institutional position.  Most of the time the CCAE seemed to 
be a shining example of trusting obedience to its political 
masters and supportive of its own leadership in battling 
against the horrid things being said about it by people at the 
ANU. 
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The notable exception was the CCAE College Fellow who was 
afforded the platform of a weekly column in the Canberra 
Times.  It seems Bill Mandle generally set out to offend 
conventional liberal-socialist opinion whenever possible, 
demeaning the whole idea of a CAE on several occasions. But 
even he found the idea of reabsorption into the ANU – becoming 
a professor in advance of his former colleagues - too 
delicious to criticise.  His pragmatic support for a merger 
which brought him back as a professor in his old department 
widely regarded to have been pleased to be rid of him merely 
added fuel to the anti-merger flames. 
 
Insert from Verona Burgess article 
 
(b) Losing the War? 
 
But if the University of Canberra seemed, in the words of the 
cliché, to have won the public relations battle by 1990, did 
this mean that the outcome seems to have been good policy-
making in the longer term?   In particular, how well has a 
separate University of Canberra survived the stresses 
engendered by the more recent reform activities?    
  
A change of government from Labor to Liberal-National 
Coalition in 1996 has created an environment that is highly 
threatening to the newer creations which emerged as autonomous 
universities under the Dawkins reforms.  The objectives of the 
new regime were not to restore the status quo but to increase 
levels of competition among universities.  The aim was to 
effectively force down costs per student and notionally 
increase institutional efficiency and productivity, relieving 
the impost on the public purse. 
 
Over time, this means that the strong will get relatively 
stronger as they exploit the benefits accrued by decades of 
preferment, and the weak will battle to retain credibility as 
a legitimate alternative. Thus the Vice-Chancellor of 
Melbourne University’s first reaction to the 1996 changes was 
to demonstrate conditional enthusiasm for the benefit which 
might flow from the deregulated environment they created 
(Gilbert, 1996). By contrast, within weeks of the 1996 Budget, 
newer institutions were announcing staff cuts and regional 
universities, which had emerged during the Dawkins era, were 
facing a bleak and uncompetitive future as the lowest rungs on 
the ladder of student aspirations. 
 
These regional institutions outside capital cities sometimes 
had the comfort of local ‘protectors’ but were acutely aware 
of the threat posed by a combination of four forces:  
 
 a commitment to a free market with institutions able to 
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charge fees, which that market would bear; 
 
continuing evidence of student preferences for courses 
offered in the longer-established universities  
 
 an overall cut-back in funding across the sector likely 
to continue for the indefinite future 
 
 a perception held by both Liberal politicians and 
bureaucrats that Dawkins had allowed the creation of too 
many institutions in total to meet a declining demand. 
 
(refer Marginson) 
 
Little solace was given to the `weaker’ institutions by public 
statements from senior political figures that ‘if elite 
universities develop in Australia, no-one should complain, 
because education means bringing out the best in people’ (Tony 
Abbott).  There were further comments accepting the 
recognition of hierarchies based on market signals were  
presumed to relate to quality. 
  
 Respected advisers from these elite universities reinforced 
this view.  An article evocatively entitled `Dawkins's Vision 
Splendid Fading’, reported details of a planning document 
`Future Arrangements for Policy Advice and Program 
Administration in Higher Education’, provided by ANU senior 
staff members Bob Arthur and Chris Burgess to Senator Tierney, 
Chairman of the Senate Employment, Education and Training 
Legislation Committee:  
 
The demographic and participation trends over the next 5-
7 years suggest that a downsizing of the system is 
warranted and will be essential if quality teaching and 
research is to be maintained, let alone enhanced.  The 
economy will increasingly find it difficult to absorb 
into professionally satisfying and community-beneficial 
employment the large number of such students currently 
graduating from universities.  There is an opportunity to 
implement fundamental sea-change reforms which would 
reverse the 'levelling down' tendencies central to the 
Unified National System concept, and remove bureaucratic 
restrictions inhibiting flexibility and effectiveness. 
 (quoted in Juddery, 1996) 
 
Six years down the track since then, the engine of reform is 
now again steaming ahead with a new enquiry process shortly to 
reach fruition.  A change of Minister presaged a more global 
approach to the future shape of the sector, rather than 
allowing the market forces to take their toll.  The precise 
outline of these reforms remains unclear for the moment but 
explicit recognition of the persistent nature of the 
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historical hierarchy seems clear in the practice, if not 
necessarily the rhetoric, of the current regime. 
 
Much energy has been expended by various groups seeking to 
find an optimal position in this hierarchy.  Among the 
plethora of papers, three are worth noting here: 
 
  The head of the Canberra Institute of Technology (ie the old 
TAFE body) reinforced his case for TAFE integration with the 
university system by pointing to the persistence and 
effectiveness of the Memorandum of Understanding with the 
University of Canberra signed back in 1989 and twice renewed 
as a basis for 84 separate agreements on credit transfer. 
(Peter Veenker writing in Campus Review, Oct 23-29,2002) 
 
The VC of New England University in inland NSW argued the need 
for special financial provision for "regional" institutions 
isolated and distant from major population centres; these were 
genuinely regional in character and conferred important social 
advantages to their region. Even though she is a former DVC of 
Canberra, her definition embraced 11 universities with claims 
for this special support but excluded Canberra. (Ingrid Moses, 
Campus Review, Oct 30 - Nov 5) 
 
On the page opposite, the current VC of the University of 
Canberra proclaimed that "as a regional university" UC is 
particularly aware of the importance of diversity, 
specialisation and linkages with other institutions, sectors 
and outreach into the region.  He defined something called the 
"capital region" extending into NSW and barely mentioned the 
ANU apart from the need for the Commonwealth to reward 
institutional collaboration which resulted in less 
duplication. (Roger Dean, Campus Review, Oct 30-Nov 5,2002) 
 
Taking a magisterial overview, Simon Marginson suggested that, 
despite all the energy, the talk and the raised expectations 
the review by Minister Brendan Nelson has been another wasted 
opportunity.  "Since the spectacularly successful reform 
program of John Dawkins and the follow-up work of his junior 
Minister Peter Baldwin, who together with Ian Chubb developed 
quality assurance in the early 1990s, the Commonwealth has 
become increasingly disconnected from the realities of the 
sector . . . 
 
Increasingly, policy has been left to the Commonwealth 
Department.  The department's preferred position, one that 
makes it the smallest political target and is consistent with 
market ideology, is to treat universities as self-managing and 
self-referenced institutions, akin to private corporations... 
 
The price has been policy irrelevance and the alarming pattern 
of sectoral deterioration, unevenness and drift. . . 
 
 28 
 
The policy malaise in Australian higher education is that 
Canberra has foregone its contribution to the broader public 
and private outcome of higher education in a knowledge 
economy, while at the same time it has nudged universities 
themselves into an increasingly narrow and self-centred 
understanding of their role." (Marginson, Campus Review, Oct 
30 – Nov 5, 2002). 
 
But where is the University of Canberra now and would the 
staff and students benefitted from "getting with the strength" 
embodied in the ANU's national and international reputation 
for research excellence?  
 
Opinions differ about where the University of Canberra now 
sits, but it is not perceived to be in the top rank alongside 
the ANU. Writing a decade after its creation, Aitkin as Vice 
Chancellor of the University of Canberra observed that  
"Australia seems to have three broad groups of universities, 
with UC well placed in the middle group, which is a most 
respectable place for it, given its youth and funding….  
 
As for the UC, the most obvious conclusion to draw was that it 
had been a ‘university’ all along.  Like a good diver, it 
entered the waters of the university system with scarcely a 
splash.  Within the system it was plainly doing well, never at 
the bottom of any ranking, usually somewhere in the middle, 
occasionally to the fore.”  (Aitkin in Teather 66) 
 
Even this relatively modest assessment is not supported by 
scholars making a more systemic study of the impact of 
successive changes engendered by Dawkins and then his non-
Labor successors.  Simon Marginson is the leading authority on 
this topic and has written in several places on the intended 
and unintended effects of the changes, especially the impact 
on the relative standing of various groups of institutions.   
 
Marginson's research findings were that the impact of 
combination of government policies was to strengthen elite 
institutions (like the ANU) and reduce the relative position 
of institutions (like the University of Canberra) that had 
been created as new universities 
 
“The heightened contest between universities and the entry of 
18 new players in the market might suggest that performance 
pressures on the existing universities were much increased.  
This reckons without the primacy of positional factors in a 
segmented market, which enabled the leading universities to 
continue their historic monopoly over high value education 
while protecting themselves from the sharp end of 
competition.” 
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Marginson argued persuasively that four segments had emerged 
which were clearly differentiated and that the "parity of 
esteem" once proudly proclaimed by the first Principal of the 
Canberra CAE was even further away than before the creation of 
the University of Canberra. (footnote Richardson).  The ANU 
was clearly identified within the top group of 8 "sandstone 
universities" despite its relatively modest student enrolment; 
UC was near the bottom of the fourth segment. 
 
 [Ten pre-1987 universities labelled “Wannabee Sandstones" 
were in the third segment, behind the only perceived winners 
from the change, the capital city universities of technology 
who formed the second segment. This raised the interesting 
question of whether UC would have been better off if it had 
sought to retain the links it forged while a CAE with this 
group, which is now grouped in the Australian Technology 
Network.] 
 
 
TABLE reproduced – ANU 1, UC 30 
 
 
“In the post-1996 system, the New Universities (like UC) were 
confirmed in their junior status and their relative position 
deteriorated…  regardless of their product quality, their 
efficiency or their sensitivity to student-customers, the 
competitive position of the strongest universities has 
improved simply as a function of the system redesign… 
 
It should be recognized that by reforming higher education in 
this manner, the two Governments between them have provided a 
form of protection to the leading dozen institutions 
(including the ANU) that is as effective as direct subsidies 
would have been and, politically, more effective because it is 
de facto and not de jure.”  (p 13) 
 
In Marginson's view, then, however badly the ANU actually 
performed and conducted its affairs, system dynamics and 
government policy meant that it would improve its position 
relative to the University of Canberra. 
 
The effect of this differential cannot be judged against any 
hypothetical merged institution, because the sticking point in 
negotiations from the perspective of the University of 
Canberra negotiators was always the desire for equitable 
treatment rather than automatic subordination to the narrow 
interests of the existing ANU staff and the protection of the 
interests of CCAE students and their access to courses.  
 
It is possible to only guess at the ways things might have 
played out in practice.  What is clear however is that a 
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significant opportunity was lost for the UC staff and students 
to be part of a more dynamic and expanded institution 
approximating the original aspirations of John Dawkins. 
Dawkins may well have been pursuing the right policy from the 
perspective of individuals within the then CCAE. 
 
It would only have been right, however, if the ANU had become 
more "dynamic" and its attitudes and structures had changed. 
It needed to be willing to accept students from the CCAE which 
it sought to exclude either on the basis of lower entry 
qualifications for similar courses – law and accounting, for 
example – or because the courses themselves were denied entry 
into a "real" university – nursing, teaching etc.  The staff 
also needed to be afforded the same balance of current 
workload and opportunities for advancement afforded existing 
ANU staff.  As one participant commented privately, "better to 
be an autonomous teacher in a fourth rate institution than 
cleaning the toilets in a first rate one".  
 
The reason the merger proposal failed was that, from the 
start, those controlling the CCAE response were convinced that 
the ANU leadership lacked the ability to strike a reasonable 
bargain because of internal constraints within that 
organisation.  This conviction was reinforced as events 
unfolded and the ANU’s culture asserted itself.  Ultimately 
nothing which has happened since then gives me cause for 
concern about whether the decisions taken in 1989 were in the 
best interests of the students and staff of what is now the 
University of Canberra.  
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list of attachments – handouts for presentation 
 
 
Briefing note to CCAE Council, 17 January 89 
 
"More professors on CCAE campus" 22 February 1989 
 
"Unfruitful marriage of fish and fowl", 24 Feb 1989 
 
Canberra Times Cartoon, 27 March 1989 
 
CCAE Principal's Newsletter No 16, August 1989 
 
"Monash connection ready to go" 22 August 1989 
 
Canberra Times on ANU Council debate 
 
"Merger vote : how the debate split the ANU"  
 
"The gang of four rides again" 17 October 1989 
 
Aitken on UC 
 
Marginson comments on hierarchical persistence 
 
Marginal league table (photocopy) 
 
Marginson on Nelson review 
 
"The push and pull for new university" 26 April 1990 
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OHPXX 
Professor Bryant, the Dean of Science, 
who spoke strongly for the 
amalgamation...wanted to say that a 
letter circulated to all council members 
and reported in yesterday’s Canberra 
Times had been “offensive” and “frankly 
insulting” about the CCAE.  However, 
Professor Bryant said that a newsletter 
from the principal of the CCAE was also 
“offensive” and typified the way in which 
attitudes at the ANU had been manipulated 
by the CCAE in the past year.  He accused 
Professor Scott of “adroit political 
manoeuvring” to secure the high ground. 
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OHPXX 
The head of the Research School of Social 
Sciences, Professor Paul Bourke, said he 
found himself in a middle position.  
Until now, he had supported every move 
towards amalgamation.  Now, however, he 
found himself moving in another 
direction. 
 
Previously he had voted a marginal “for” 
on the ground that there would be growth 
of moneys in the system.  His Faculty had 
voted against.  At the board meeting he 
had said that he believed his faculty was 
wrong.  But now, as a member of Council, 
he could only do that on two conditions: 
 if the signal around the university was 
unequivocal and if there was a clear 
signal that the CCAE really wanted the 
merger. 
 
Professor Scott’s letter was a political 
intervention.  It meant that the ANU 
could struggle to a “yes” vote only to be 
confronted by with the strong view of the 
College.  Professor Scott had stressed 
the importance of the “fully integrated 
model” for amalgamation.  The ANU had 
fudged it and fell a long way short of 
Professor Scott’s view.” 
 
(Canberra Times, 9 September 1989) 
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OHPXX 
 
 "Australia seems to have three broad 
groups of universities, with UC well 
placed in the middle group, which is 
a most respectable place for it, 
given its youth and funding….  
 
As for the UC, the most obvious 
conclusion to draw was that it had 
been a ‘university’ all along. 
 
  Like a good diver, it entered the 
waters of the university system with 
scarcely a splash.  Within the system 
it was plainly doing well, never at 
the bottom of any ranking, usually 
somewhere in the middle, occasionally 
to the fore.”   
 
(Aitkin in Teather 66) 
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OHP XX 
 
“In the post-1996 system, the New 
Universities (like UC) were confirmed in 
their junior status and their relative 
position deteriorated…  regardless of 
their product quality, their efficiency 
or their sensitivity to student-
customers, the competitive position of 
the strongest universities has improved 
simply as a function of the system 
redesign… 
 
It should be recognized that by reforming 
higher education in this manner, the two 
Governments between them have provided a 
form of protection to the leading dozen 
institutions (including the ANU) that is 
as effective as direct subsidies would 
have been and, politically, more 
effective because it is de facto and not 
de jure.”   
 
(Marginson p 13) 
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OHP XX 
"Since the spectacularly successful 
reform program of John Dawkins and the 
follow-up work of his junior Minister 
Peter Baldwin, who together with Ian 
Chubb developed quality assurance in the 
early 1990s, the Commonwealth has become 
increasingly disconnected from the 
realities of the sector . .  
 
Increasingly, policy has been left to the 
Commonwealth Department.  The 
department's preferred position, one that 
makes it the smallest political target 
and is consistent with market ideology, 
is to treat universities as self-managing 
and self-referenced institutions, akin to 
private corporations... 
 
The price has been policy irrelevance and 
the alarming pattern of sectoral 
deterioration, uneveness and drift. . . 
 
The policy malaise in Australian higher 
education is that Canberra has foregone 
its contribution to the broader public 
and private outcomes of higher education 
in a knowledge economy, while at the same 
time it has nudged universities 
themselves into an increasingly narrow 
and self-centred understanding of their 
role."  
(Marginson, Campus Review 2002). 
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"Nostalgia is a tricky if pleasantly 
self-indulgent emotion.  It should be 
tempered by rigorous efforts at      
objectivity and some attempt at self-
criticism.   
 
Sometimes those with nostalgia for 
the old days in universities can 
exhibit misty-eyed romanticism and 
longing for an imperfectly remembered 
past. And those who  idealise the past 
often paint the present in stark, 
negative terms.... 
 
Academics individually and collectively 
should grasp the  realities of both the 
past and the present, and show a 
willingness to work as a part of a 
wider community for a better educated, 
fairer and wider future." 
 
Jane Nichols (1995) 
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OHPXX 
 
Universities of the past catered for a 
social elite who had privileged access 
to both financial and cultural capital 
which enable them to qualify to enter 
higher  education, on the one hand, 
and to support themselves while they 
were there on the other.  
 
 Scholarships were handed out on the 
basis of 'academic merit’, which 
apparently was also largely the 
property of people who owned the other 
kinds of capital. 
 
  The few working-class kids who made 
it to, and through, university in the 
1950's are remembered precisely because 
they were exceptional. 
 
 
Nichols, p 8  
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OHPXX 
 
There have been many achievements 
of the Unified National System of 
higher education, not the least of 
which is the expanded 
participation of young Australians 
and the embedding of targeted 
equity programs across the system. 
 
 However, the mix of regulatory 
and deregulatory relations between 
the government and the 
universities has precipitated a 
number of policy dilemmas.  
 
(Lingard,1994) 
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OHPXX 
 
“The heightened contest between 
universities and the entry of 18 new 
players in the market might suggest 
that performance pressures on the 
existing universities were much 
increased.   
 
This reckons without the primacy of 
positional factors in a segmented 
market, which enabled the leading 
universities to continue their 
historic monopoly over high value 
education while protecting themselves 
from the sharp end of competition.” 
 
Marginson 
 
